FTC Attempts to Abolish Vicarious Liability Defenses for Deceptive Sales Practices: Strict Liability for Manufacturers by Dell\u27Ario, A. Charles
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 25 | Issue 5 Article 2
1-1974
FTC Attempts to Abolish Vicarious Liability
Defenses for Deceptive Sales Practices: Strict
Liability for Manufacturers
A. Charles Dell'Ario
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
A. Charles Dell'Ario, FTC Attempts to Abolish Vicarious Liability Defenses for Deceptive Sales Practices: Strict Liability for Manufacturers,
25 Hastings L.J. 1142 (1974).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol25/iss5/2
FTC ATTEMPTS TO ABOLISH VICARIOUS LIABILITY
DEFENSES FOR DECEPTIVE SALES PRACTICES:
STRICT LIABILITY FOR MANUFACTURERS?
The cornerstone for the federal government's policing of unfair
and deceptive practices in the marketplace is Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.1  As originally enacted 2 the act proscribed
only "unfair methods of competition in commerce" and was intended
to enable the commission to supplement the Justice Department's pros-
ecutions under the Sherman3 and Clayton Acts. 4  Under the original
act undesirable practices affecting consumers were immune from the
Federal Trade Commission's [FTC] cease and desist orders. The Su-
preme Court in FTC v. Raladam Co.' had held a manufacturer of
an "obesity cure" had not violated Section 5 because his false adver-
tising practices were not shown by the commission to be harmful of
competition. This decision provided the major impetus for congres-
sional amendment of the act in 1938 adding "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce" to the prohibition against unfair methods
of competition. 6
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FTCA].
2. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719.
3. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §H 1-7 (1970).
4. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. H9 12-27, 44; 29 U.S.C. 9H 1-7 (1970). "A major
purpose of [the Federal Trade Commission Act] was to enable the Commission to
strain practices as 'unfair' which, although not yet having grown into Sherman Act
dimensions would, most likely do so if left unrestrained." FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948).
5. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
6. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111. "The necessity of this
amendment is made apparent by the decision of the [sic] Supreme Court in a case
involving deceptive advertising in which the Commission had issued its order to
cease and desist. In that case the Court said:
"'If the necessity of protecting the public against dangerously misleading adver-
tisements of a remedy sold in interstate commerce were all that is necessary to give
the Commission jurisdiction, the order could not successfully be assailed.'
"In spite of the finding of the Supreme Court that the advertising in question was
misleading and dangerous to the public, it held that the Commission had no jurisdiction
to order the respondent to cease and desist because it had not been shown that the
respondent had competitors who were injured." 16E J. VoN KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS
ORGAIZATIONS § 38.06[2], at 38-92, n.12 (1971) [hereinafter cited as voN KALINOWSEI]
citing S. REP. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
"[The] Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the FTCA . . .was aimed primarily at broad-
ening the FTC's jurisdiction by granting it power to regulate 'unfair or deceptive acts
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Business has engaged in a wide variety of legal gyrations to blunt
the effectiveness of the FTC in curbing deceptive sales practices. In
order to insulate themselves from liability for such practices, business
is likely to establish a legal barrier between a manufacturer and its
sales organization by making that sales organization at least a nomi-
nally separate business entity. Unless the commission can hold a man-
ufacturer liable for deceptive practices, a manufacturer can thwart at-
tempts to halt deceptive practices merely by reorganizing its sales
group. An extreme example of such manipulation came to the courts
in 1970 in P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC.7
In 1939 the FTC docketed a complaint against P. F. Comler & Son
Corp. of New Jersey, a wholly-owned sales subsidiary of Crowell-Col-
lier. Crowell-Collier organized a new P. F. Collier & Son Corp. in
Delaware and merged the New Jersey corporation into the parent.
The FTC complaint was dismissed. In 1952 the Delaware corporation
was dissolved and merged into the parent after the United States had
initiated criminal proceedings against it for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. For two years encyclopedias were sold
through a division of Crowell-Collier, but in 1954 a new P. F. Comler
& Son Corp. of Delaware appeared and resumed sales operations for
the parent. In 1960, the FTC again complained against P. F. Collier
& Son Corp. for deceptive sales practices in the sales of encyclopedias.
That same year a new corporation, P. F. Collier, Inc. was formed to
conduct sales operations and P. F. Collier & Son Corp. merged into
its parent, Crowell-Collier. Directors and officers of the parent held
similar positions in the various subsidiaries. Throughout this period,
encyclopedias were sold to the public in the same manner later held
to constitute a deceptive sales practice. The corporate purpose in the
articles of incorporation P. F. Collier, Inc. contained wording identical
to that of its predecessor. Yet in the ten years that the proceedings
dragged on, Crowell-Collier maintained it should not be liable for the
acts of its various subsidiaries and that the complaint should be dis-
missed because there was no defendant against whom to proceed.
The FTC and the Sixth Circuit rejected this defense.'
The courts have been liberal in interpreting the commission's func-
tion in regulating and controlling unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive business practices. The Supreme Court has in-
or practices in commerce' in addition to 'unfair methods of competitions in commerce,'
and at eliminating the cumbersome procedures for the enforcement of FTC cease and
desist orders by providing that they would become final unless an appeal were taken
within the statutory time period provided." United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355
F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
7. 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970). For a further
discussion of the case, see the text accompanying note 68 infra.
8. Id.
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terpreted the act as giving the commission broad powers to declare
trade practices unfair9 and power to shape the remedy necessary, man-
dating to the courts that interference with the commission's decision
is permissible only when there is no reasonable relation between the
remedy and the violation."0 Congress left the wording of the statute
broad so as to permit the commission " 'to eradicate evils with the
least risk of interfering with legitimate business operations.' In thus
divining that there is no limit to business ingenuity and legal gymnas-
tics the Congress displayed much foresight.""
This note will examine the conflicts between this broad mandate
of power and the traditional concepts of the separateness of business
entities which have arisen and continue to arise when the commission
attempts to ignore the separateness of these entities in promulgating
its cease and desist orders and in prosecuting violators. In attempting
to eliminate unfair and decepteive practices, the commission has
sought to direct at each respondent the broadest possible order so that
the efficiency of the act is not avoided by a mere change in the legal
form by which the respondent conducts its business. Focusing on the
vicarious responsibility of the named respondent for the deceptive
practices of the individuals or organizations selling its product or ser-
vice, this note will examine three general types of sales-distribution
arrangements and discuss the success of various respondents in avoid-
ing vicarious liability for deceptive practices under each.' 2
Since 1938, when the Wheeler-Lea Amendment expanded the
FTC's jurisdiction to include the prevention of deceptive practices in
commerce, the commission has steadfastly sought to avoid any common
law separateness of business entities with which manufacturers at-
tempted to insulate themselves from charges of deceptive practices.
13
Always asserting the policy behind the act as justification, the earliest
cases were successful in striking down the most transparent separate
formation, the independent contractor.' 4  Later success came in disre-
9. E.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966); FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304,
310 (1934).
10. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 377 (1965); FTC v. National Lead
Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946).
11. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965), citing, H.R. Conf. Rep
No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
12. The commission has also been successful in imposing its orders on the indi-
viduals behind the corporate respondents, "piercing the corporate veil," but a discussion
of these actions is beyond the scope of this note.
13. See, e.g., P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1970);
Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957); Steelco Stainless Steel, Inc. v. FTC,
187 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1951); International Art Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 393 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 632 (1940); Universe Chem., Inc., 77 F.T.C. 598 (1970).
14. See text accompanying notes 34-49 infra.
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garding corporate subsidiaries. 5 The final barrier which the commis-
sion is being asked to break down is that between a manufacturer
and a dealer selling the product whose only relationship to the manu-
facturer is wholesaler-retailer. 6 Under the present case law, it ap-
pears these independent dealers are beyond the scope of a manufac-
turer's responsibilities. 17  While too stringent controls on allegedly in-
dependent dealers have led to FTC complaints against the manufac-
turer for antitrust violations, there are at least two untried theories
under which the commission could impose liability for acts of even
these independent dealers. 18 This note will conclude with an exami-
nation of these theories and a prognosis for future FTC prosecutions.
The Commission's Approach to Vicarious Responsibility
Because consumers rely most heavily on information given them by
salespersons, the unfair or deceptive practices in commerce proscribed
by the act almost invariably occur at the consumer sales level.' 9 The
commission's job of curbing deceptive practices is made more complex
by the manufacturers' use of various sales distribution methods. While
some manufacturers employ their own organic sales forces, many have
developed distribution systems in which formally separate business en-
tities do the direct selling. The manufacturers generally employ one
or more of the following basic systems:
1. Single salesmen, called independent contractors, who are not ac-
tually employed by the manufacturers.
2. Owned or controlled subsidiary corporations who employ sales-
men to distribute manufacturers' products.
3. Unrelated corporations or retail dealers who sell manufacturers'
products, either exclusively or in conjunction with other lines.
The commission's attempts to impose vicarious liability upon manu-
facturers for deceptive sales practices occurs in both types of proceed-
ings utilized by the commission to curb these practices. In order to
15. See text accompanying notes 53-80 infra.
16. Grolier, Inc., No. 8879 (F.T.C., filed Mar. 9, 1972).
17. See text accompanying note 97 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 97-100, 114-119 infra.
19. Von Kalinowski lists eight practices which have been held violative of the
act. They include: (1) misrepresentations concerning the origin or composition of the
product; (2) use of similar trade names, packaging or design; (3) supplying inaccurate
labels or tags; (4) half-truths; (5) come-on advertising; (6) misleading descriptive
names; (7) deceptive collection practices; and (8) use of lotteries or other gambling
devices in the distribution of merchandise. 16E VoN KALINowsm, supra note 6, §
41.01. All of these practices are aimed at consumers. Where retailers or other manu-
facturers are involved, the practices become unfair methods of competition covered by
the first clause of section 5 of the FTCA. Cf. 16B VON KALNowsKI, supra note 6,
§ 41.01, at 41-5, 41-6.
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justify the imposition of a cease and desist order the commission's com-
plaint counsel will want to attribute the deceptive practices of a manu-
facturer's sales organization to the manufacturer. Secondly, once a
cease and desist order has been entered against a manufacturer, the
commission will try to prove a violation when a deceptive practice is
committed by that manufacturer's allegedly separate sales force in a
proceeding before a federal district court to collect civil penalties. 2
Therefore, the orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission are
phrased to run not only to the named respondents but to "successor[s],
assign[s] and officers, agents, representatives, salesmen, and employees,
directly or indirectly, through any corporate or other device ... 21
However, respondents in these proceedings typically assert that they
should be responsible only for the acts of their direct agents or em-
ployees and not for the acts of independent sales organizations. Un-
der the broadly phrased orders, the commission is now attempting to
hold manufacturers liable for deceptive sales practices regardless of
the method used to distribute the product. Theoretically, anyone who
sells the product of another in whatever capacity could be called that
other's "representative. '2  To date, the commission has been success-
ful in asserting the liability of manufacturers who distribute their prod-
uct through thinly disguised independent contractors or subsidiary cor-
porations. The commission is relying on the courts to continue the
liberal trend of looking through the legal relationships established in
product distribution to impose liability on manufacturers when anyone
sells their products in a deceptive manner.
Independent Contractors
The Petitioner's Primary Contention is that the Salesmen...
Were Independent Contractors, For Whose Actions
He Was Not Responsible.23
An independent contractor is one who contracts to do work accord-
ing to his own methods, without being subject to the control of his
employer, with the exception of the product or result of his work. 24
The legal effect of such a relationship is that employers are not gen-
20. 3 TRADERE. REP. 9701 (1971).
21. P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261, 265 n.6 (6th Cir. 1970); see,
e.g., Complaint at 27, Grolier, Inc., No. 8879 (F.T.C. filed Mar. 9, 1972).
22. Representative has been defined as: "One who represents or stands in the
place of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1466 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); cf. United States
v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 306 (1956) (anyone who deals with an employer on behalf
of employees concerning employment matters is a representative).
23. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 590 (9th Cir. 1957).
24. Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200, 206 (9th Cir. 1962); Long v.
Valley Steel Prod. Co., 207 F.2d 505, 507 (10th Cir. 1953); see Casement v. Brown,
148 U.S. 615 (1893).
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erally liable for the torts their independent contractors committed dur-
ing the performance of the contract work." Respondents in Federal
Trade Commission adjudicative proceedings have frequently asserted
this relationship between themselves and the persons selling their prod-
ucts, disclaiming liability or responsibility for deceptive practices of
these persons. As will be shown the cases reflect the courts' disfavor
with this defense.
No single factor has been determinative of the question of whether
or not a salesperson was an independent contractor. In the cases in
which the commission or the courts refused to find independent con-
tractor status for the purpose of Section 5 of the FTCA, one or more
of the following indicia have been present:
1. Respondent gave express instructions on the sales representa-
tions to be made.2 6
2. The salespersons did not purchase their own sales material and
advertising.
2 7
3. Salespersons did not purchase their own stock and maintain it.2
s
4. The billing and shipping was done directly by respondent to
the customer.2 9
5. Salespersons were given credentials introducing them as repre-
sentatives of the manufacturer. 80
6. The salespersons received a salary, often termed an advance
on commissions."'
25. Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42, 53 (3d Cir. 1963); Southern Natural Gas
Co. v. Wilson, 304 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1962); Capitol Chevrolet Co. v. Lawrence Ware-
house Co., 227 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1955).
26. Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, 198 F.2d 404, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1952); Carlton
Fredericks, 71 F.T.C. 193, 209-13 (1967); Wilmington Chem. Corp., 69 F.T.C. 828, 905-
09 (1966); National Trade Publications Serv., Inc., 58 F.T.C. 706 (1961), affd, 300
F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1962).
27. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957); Steelco Stainless
Steel, Inc. v. FTC, 187 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1951); All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc., 75
F.T.C. 465, 474 (1969); Wilmington Chem. Corp., 69 F.T.C. 828, 905-09 (1966);
Graystone Portrait Agency, 55 F.T.C. 982, 985 (1959).
28. Steelco Stainless Steel, Inc. v. FTC, 187 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1951); Atlas
Aluminum Co., 71 F.T.C. 762, 785-87 (1967); Wilmington Chem. Corp., 69 F.T.C. 828,
909 (1966).
29. Globe Readers Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 285 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1961); Goodman
v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957); Atlas Aluminum Co., 71 F.T.C. 762, 785-87
(1967).
30. Globe Readers Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 285 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1961); International
Art Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 393 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 632 (1940); Universe
Chem., Inc., 77 F.T.C. 598, 609 (1970); National Trade Publications Ser,., Inc., 58
F.T.C. 706 (1961); Graystone Portrait Agency, 55 F.T.C. 982 (1959).
31. Star Office Supply Co., 77 F.T.C. 383, 444 (1970); Atlas Aluminum Co.,
71 F.T.C. 762, 785-87 (1967); Wilmington Chem. Corp., 69 F.T.C. 828, 909 (1966).
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7. Control of credit arrangements involved in the sale was in the
hands of the manufacturer.32
On their face, these factors do not appear to be significantly differ-
ent than those used to defeat an alleged independent contractor status
at common law.3 3  However, the courts have repeatedly indicated that
they will not be bound by common law principles in determining the
scope of an employer's liability. 4 Although never expressly stated,
the result seems to be that the commission's complaint counsel are
relieved from making a rigorous showing of a master-servant relation-
ship once a deceptive practice has been demonstrated. Doubts or con-
flicts as to the nature of the relationship between respondent and the
salespersons appear to be resolved in favor of a finding that respondent
is liable for the deceptive practices.35
The leading articulation of this philosophy appeared in Goodman
v. FTC,3 6 where the court emphasized the policy of the FTCA as re-
quiring the rejection of a flimsy independent contractor defense:
[W]hen interpreting a statute the aim of which is to regulate
interstate commerce and to control and outroot some evil practices
in it, the courts are not concerned with the refinements of com-
32. Inter-State Builders, Inc., 72 F.T.C. 370, 401-04 (1967); Atlas Aluminum Co.,
71 F.T.C. 762, 785-87 (1967).
33. The factors for determining whether a person is an independent contractor
at common law have been stated alternatively by various courts. Buchanan v. United
States, 305 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1962); Beatty v. Halpin, 267 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1959);
King v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 169 F.2d 497 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 891 (1948). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1957)
also makes a complete compilation: "In determining whether one acting for another
is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others,
are considered: (a) the extent of control which, by agreement, the master can exercise
over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business: . . . (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies
the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; ...
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not
the work is part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties
believe they are creating the relation of master and servant .... "
34. United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 184-85 (1970) (United
States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947); McComb v. Homeworkers' Handicraft Coopera-
tive, 176 F.2d 633, 636 (4th Cir. 1949); Walling v. American Needlecrafts, 139 F.2d
60, 63-64 (6th Cir. 1943); cf. FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 119-20
(1937); Sebastopol Meat Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 440 F.2d 983, 984-86 (9th
Cir. 1971).
35. Examination of the way the commission and courts have brushed aside this
independent contractor defense suggests this conclusion. See, e.g., Libby-Owens-Ford
Glass Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 415 (6th Cir. 1965); Carlton Fredericks, 71 F.T.C. 193,
226 (1967); National Trade Publications Serv., Inc., 58 F.T.C. 706, 710 (1961), af'd,
300 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1962); Basic Books, Inc., 56 F.T.C. 69, 73 (1959); Tri-State
Printers, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 1019, 1027 (1957); cf. Universal Interchange, Inc., 63 F.T.C.
350, 371 (1963).
36. 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957).
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mon-law definitions, when they endeavor to ascertain the power of
any agency to which the Congress has entrusted the regulation of
the business activity or the enforcement of standards it has estab-
lished.
37
The court arrived at this conclusion through an analogy to a Su-
preme Court interpretation of the Labor Management Relations Act 38
in NLRB v. Hearst Publications.9 There, the Court was trying to
determine whether newsboys were employees rather than independent
contractors such that the newspapers would be required to bargain with
the union representing them. After noting that there was a lack of
uniformity in the common law relationships of independent contractors,
the Court concluded that Congress could not have intended to incor-
porate those standards into a statute requiring national uniformity.40
The objective of the statute was the prime consideration in giving
meaning to the word employee. The Court would not let the policy
of this regulatory legislation be frustrated by the niceties of common law
definitions.
In Goodman, petitioner published a course in weaving. By virtue
of contracts made with the salespersons who peddled the course,
Goodman claimed they were independent contractors for whose acts
it was not liable. However, the court noted that Goodman provided
the sales kit, trained the salespersons, supplied them with credentials,
contracted directly with customers and shipped the orders without any
intermediation by a salesperson. The court had little difficulty in find-
ing the salespersons to be Goodman's agents and in justifying the im-
position of liability on Goodman for their misrepresentations. The
court said it only needed "to determine whether misrepresentations
were made within the apparent scope of the authority of the salesper-
sons."
41
37. Id. at 590.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
39. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
40. "It will no do, for deciding this question as one of uniform national applica-
tion, to import wholesale the traditional common-law conceptions or some distilled es-
sence of their local variations as exclusively controlling limitations upon the scope of
the statutes effectiveness. To do this would be merely to select some of the local,
hairline variations for nation-wide application and thus to reject others for coverage
under the Act. That result hardly would be consistent with the statute's broad terms
and purposes." Id. at 125, cited in Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 590-91 (9th Cir.
1957).
41. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 591 (9th Cir. 1957). The court in Goodman
relied heavily upon International Art Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1940): "[E]ach
salesman was issued a certificate designating him as the representative of the Art Com-
pany; the order was taken in its name; the picture was shippped in its name, and
the customer was notified in its name of the time of delivery. All blanks used by
the salesmen were furnished by the Art Company and bore its name. The customer
had a right to believe-in fact, could not have believed otherwise, than that the sales-,
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In the fifteen years following the Goodman decision, the commission
has relied heavily upon it to sweep away respondents' disclaimers of
responsibility for acts of their independent sales agents. For example,
registration under state law of the salespersons as independent contrac-
tors has not been deemed controlling. 2 In another case, the only
information presented customers bore the manufacturer's name. This
was the main basis for a finding that the salespersons were the manu-
facturer's agents." One manufacturer had the sales force certified
as its representatives and supplied them with order forms upon which
its name was printed. When the facts also indicated that the manufac-
turer knew of the unauthorized and deceptive business practices, liabil-
ity was imposed.44 Similarly, where respondent furnished contracts
and credit applications with its name imprinted, allowed the sales persons
to use its office and phones, and provided customers through its paid
advertising system, liability was imposed.45
The most comprehensive analysis of the relevant factors appeared
in Wilmington Chemical Corp.46 There, the commission noted that
even if the arrangement between respondent and its sales-persons "con-
formed factually and legally to the separateness attributed to it, that
would not be dispositive of the issue. '1'4  After reviewing the relevant
case law, the commission went on to formulate an extensive list of con-
siderations.48
The summary of this analysis is that manufacturers will have diffi-
culty in avoiding liability for any deceptive practices established to
have been committed by persons selling their products on a purported
independent contractor basis. Manufacturers must take affirmative
preventive action; they will be unable to avoid liability by merely or-
dering their salespersons to refrain from making a certain repre-
men were the agents of the Art Company, with full authority in the matter." Id. at
396. Steelco Stainless Steel, Inc. v. FTC, 187 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1951), also greatly
influenced the Goodman court: "[The] salesmen, in most instances, devote their full time
to respondents and do not sell other merchandise. These salesmen do not purchase re-
spondents' products for resale to the consumer but sell them on behalf of respondents.
Such salesmen are agents or employees of respondents and are not independent contrac-
tors or independent dealers. Respondents are fully responsible for such salesmen's acts
and statements made in connection with the sale or offering for sale of their products and
germane thereto." Id. at 697.
42. William H. Wise, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 408, 423, a!f'd per curiam, 246 F.2d 702
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957).
43. Graystone Portrait Agency, 55 F.T.C. 982 (1959).
44. Globe Readers Serv., Inc., 56 F.T.C. 1018, 1021-22 (1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 285 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1961).
45. Inter-State Builders, Inc., 72 F.T.C. 370, 403 (1967).
46. 69 F.T.C. 828 (1966).
47. Id. at 905.
48. Id. at 905-09.
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sentations.4 9 The subterfuge is too simple and the public policy too
strong for the courts to reach any other result.
Related Corporations
[A]bsent Highly Unusual Circumstances, the Corporate
Entity Will Not Be Disregarded.5"
A second type of relationship between seller and manufacturer
exists where the salespersons have been employees of separate, but
wholly-owned subsidiary corporations distinct, at least in form, from
the manufacturer. Generally, mere ownership by one corporation of
a controlling interest of the stock of another corporation does not destroy
the identity of the latter as a distinct legal entity.51  This rule
holds even though the same individuals may be officers or directors
of the two corporations.5 2 As a result, respondent manufacturers in
commission proceedings have generally sought to insulate themselves
from potential liability for deceptive practices of their owned or con-
trolled subsidiaries by asserting the legal separateness of the two cor-
porations.
The law has recognized an exception to this general rule when there
is very close identity between corporations and recognition of the sep-
arate identities would work an injustice or inequity.53  Separate cor-
porate existence can be disregarded when
[s]tock ownership has been resorted to, not for the purpose
of participating in the affairs of a corporation in the normal and
usual manner, but for the purpose. . . of controlling a subsidiary
company so that it may be used as a mere agency or instrumental-
ity of the owning company or companies.54
49. Standard Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1954); Parke, Austin &
Lipscomb, Inc. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 437, 440 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 753 (1944);
Perma-Maid Co., Inc. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941).
50. P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261, 266 (6th Cir. 1970).
51. NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1960); New Colonial Ice
Co. v. Helverin, 292 U.S. 435, 442 (1934); Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis
Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1918); ICC v. Stickney, 215 U.S. 98,
108 (1909).
52. Overstreet v. Southern Ry. Co., 371 F.2d 411, 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 912 (1967); National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 828-29 (7th Cir. 1955),
rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
53. Royal Indus. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 420 F.2d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1969); Con-
tinental Distilling Corp. v. Old Charter Distillery Co., 188 F.2d 614, 620 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
54. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S.
490, 501 (1918). Compare the famous language of Justice Cardozo in Berkey v. Third
Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926): "Dominion may be so com-
plete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be a
principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where control is less than this, we are remitted
to the tests of honesty and justice."
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The federal courts do not appear to be as eager to disregard the
corporate entity as they have disregarded the assertion of independent
contractor status in imposing liability on manufacturers for the decep-
tive practices committed by these sales organizations. 5 As early as
1923, the Second Circuit acknowledged that they would not let the
policy of a regulatory statute be frustrated by resorting to the fiction
that the corporation is separate from the stockholders.56  Despite this
early recognition of the policy considerations, the traditional common
law test for determining when the corporate entity will be disregarded
was not abandoned until recently.57 The common law test was based on
two considerations. To justify the disregard of the corporate entity, the
commission (or other administrative agency) had to show that the par-
ent possessed actual legal control over its subsidiary and used such
control to so dominate the subsidiary that the subsidiary corporation
was the alter ego of the parent.
5 8
Actual legal control was primarily a question of fact based on the
presence of the following factors: (1) Ownership of all or part of
the stock of the subsidiary; (2) Interlocking directorates or officers
who held positions in both firms.5 In the cases where vicarious liabil-
ity has been imposed under the common law test both factors have been
present although the mere ownership of a controlling interest of the
subsidiary's stock would appear sufficient."0
The exercise of such control to the point where the court or commis-
sion is compelled to reach "the conclusion that the corporate identity
of the subsidiary is a mere fiction""' has been a question of fact in
applying the policy of the act. The courts have not steadfastly relied
on certain factors to reach their conclusion to disregard the corporate
55. See, e.g., Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Deal, 474 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir. 1973); Stark
v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1960); National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825
(7th Cir. 1955); cf. Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437
(1946).
56. Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 F. 774, 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759
(1923). The same court reasserted this proposition thirty years later. Corn Prods.
Ref. Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 565 (2d Cir. 1956).
57. P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1970).
58. Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940); National Bond Fin. Co.
v. General Motors, 238 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 1022 (8th
Cir. 1965).
59. Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aero. Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1963);
National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1955); Press Co. v. NLRB, 118
F.2d 937, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
60. A parent has the power to exercise control whenever it has a controlling in-
terest in the subsidiary's stock. Interlocking directorates facilitate the exercise of that
control but do not increase the amount or degree of control possessed. Cf. Steven v.
Roscoe Turner Aero. Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963); J. POWELL, PARENT & SUB-
SIDIARY CORPORATIONS 4-12 (1931).
61. National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1955).
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form but the following indicia have emerged: (1) Use of common
offices; (2) Undercapitalization of the subsidiary; (3) Directing finan-
cial policy; (4) Providing advice and handling of subsidiary business at
the parent level; and (5) Direct dealing with the customers and adver-
tising designed to create an image of corporate unity.
62
The Second Circuit was the first court to indicate that the policy
inherent in the administrative controls imposed upon business by Con-
gress would mandate a lesser showing to pierce the corporate veil than
ordinarily is required. In Bowater Steamship Co. v. Patterson 3 the
plaintiff argued that it and defendant were separate, independent in-
dustries for purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 64  The court
spurned this contention and stated that while there may have been
sufficient independence to be regarded as separate in contract or tort
litigation, such was not necessarily so for application of this statute.6 5
This analysis was foreshadowed by Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissenting
opinion in Press Co. v. NLRB.6" Then, sitting on the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, he indicated that poten-
tial frustration of public policy would be a paramount consideration
in determining whether the corporate separateness should be disre-
garded.
The Sixth Circuit made the most severe departure from the common
law principles in its landmark decision in P. F. Collier & Son Corp.
v. FTC.67
Manifestly, where the public interest is involved, as it is in
the enforcement of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, a strict adherence to common law principles is not required
in the determination of whether a parent should be held for the
acts of its subsidiary, where strict adherence would enable the cor-
porate device to be used to circumvent the policy of the statute.
68
Judge Celebrezze, writing for the majority, first reviewed the general
rule that "absent highly unusual circumstances, the corporate entity
62. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 403 (1960); Delaware
Watch Co. v. FTC, 332 F.2d 745, 746 (2d Cir. 1964); International Art Co. v. FTC
109 F.2d 393, 396 (7th Cir. 1940); Allenton Mills, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1630, 1641 (1962);
Art Nat'l Mfg. Dist. Co., 58 F.T.C. 719, 723-24 (1961), aff'd, 298 F.2d 476 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
63. 303 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1962).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970).
65. "As the Supreme Court has repeatedly taught, the policy behind the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was a strong one; we cannot think Congress would have meant this
to be defeated by the fragmentation of an integrated business into a congeries of cor-
porate entities, however much these might properly be respected for other purposes."
Bowater S.S. Co. v. Patterson, 303 F.2d 369, 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 860
(1962).
66. 118 F.2d 937, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
67. 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
68. Id. at 267.
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will not be disregarded." '69 After rejecting the common law test for
determining the existence of these "highly unusual circumstances," he
described the evidence upon which the commission's finding of a
single Collier enterprise for the purposes of the act was based.
[The parent not only wholly-owned its Collier subsidiaries,
but also ...it: interchanged personnel with its subsidiaries and
maintained common or overlapping officers and directors; oper-
ated through its subsidiaries, which were often created and dis-
solved for purposes unrelated to the business carried on by the
corporate complex; approved the use by its subsidiaries of the
parent's name and goodwill in order to develop favorable public
associations between the parent and its subsidiaries; and possessed
and exercised ultimate control over Collier & Son.
70
Although the factors present clearly seemed to fit the common law
test, the court felt constrained to emphasize the paramount position
of policy considerations in enforcing the act (or any other public in-
terest statute) and promulgated a new test for piercing the corporate
veil.
In the alternative, however, the law is clear that where a par-
ent possesses latent power, through interlocking directorates, for
example, to direct the policy of its subsidiary, where it knows of
and tacitly approves the use by its subsidiary of deceptive practices
in commerce, and where it fails to exercise its influence to curb
the illegal trade practices, active participation by it in the affairs
of the subsidiary need not be proved to hold the parent vicariously
responsible.71
The court cited no direct authority for this new test even though it
stated that "the law is clear."' 72  The court did, however, cite Good-
man v. FTC,73 the landmark case disposing of common law considera-
tions in imposing vicarious responsibility in the independent contractor
distribution method. In so doing, the court in Collier emphasized
its adoption of a similar approach to related corporations. The court
could have justified the creation of this new test by liberally interpret-
ing earlier cases74 in which parent and subsidiary were treated as one.
The early cases had verablized the role of policy in interpreting these
statutes, but none had clearly abandoned the common law test even
though the same national uniformity was required as in the independ-
ent contractor situation.
75
Aside from the reference to interlocking directorates, Judge Cele-
69. Id. at 266.
70. Id. at 267.
71. Id. at 270.
72. Id.
73. 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957). For a discussion of the case, see text accom-
panying notes 36-42 supra.
74. See cases cited in note 62 supra.
75. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
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brezze did not indicate just what would constitute "latent power to
control." The court could have merely intended to restate the tradi-
tional test in a new manner, softened perhaps by policy considerations.
Given the language that "active participation . . . need not be
proved," '7 the court more likely intended to indicate its willingness
in future cases to impose vicarious responsibility where something less
than actual legal control actively exercised is present.
In addition to the "latent power to control," the court indicated the
parent would have to possess knowledge of the deceptive practices and
would have to fail to curb such practices.77 The evidence in the case
indicated that the Coller parent actually knew of the deceptive practices
at the salesperson-customer level. Where interlocking directorates exist,
the parent cannot be heard to say it did not know what its subsidiaries
were doing.78  Where "latent power" amounts to something less than
full interlocking directorates, the question arises whether actual knowl-
edge must be shown. If such is the requirement. this new test adds
little to the common law test. The vigorous rejection of the common
law principles in the opinion compels a contrary conclusion. If the com-
mission can show the power to control and a means of knowledge on
the part of the parent, the courts will not allow blatant deceptive prac-
tices to continue unabated.79
In future prosecutions for deceptive practices, the Federal Trade
Commission probably will enjoy success in imposing liability upon parent
corporations for the deceptive practices of their subsidiaries. The
commission will be required to make some showing of knowledge and
control due to the strong policy favoring the separateness of corporate
entities, but it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the com-
mission will be unable to make such a showing.80
76. P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 1970).
77. Id. at 270. Curbing the practice means more than a mere direction not to
engage in deceptive practices. Steelco Stainless Steel, Inc. v. FTC, 187 F.2d 693, 696
(7th Cir. 1951). Also see the cases cited in note 44 supra.
78. The knowledge of a corporate director and officer is imputed to the corpo-
ration. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 544 (D. Nev.
1972); see Phoenix Say. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 F.2d 862, 869
(4th Cir. 1970). Thus when an individual is a director of two corporations, knowledge
of the activities of one can be properly imputed to the other.
79. If a parent possesses a means of knowledge of its subsidiary's activities, it
can be properly charged with knowledge of those activities. Cf. Higgins v. Shenango
Pottery Co., 279 F.2d 46 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 899 (1960); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) oF AGENCY § 9, comment d (1957). Corporations are acknowledged to have
a duty to stockholders (in this case the parent corporation) to keep them informed
as to corporate affairs. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548, 558
(D. Utah 1970), af d in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). Therefore, a sole
shareholder (which could be a corporation) could reasonably be charged with knowl-
edge of the corporation's activities.
80. In the cases where the courts have refused to hold the parent liable for the
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Unrelated Retailers
There are a number of . . . entities to whom Respondents sell . . . at
wholesale, and who are in all other respects independent of Respondents.
81
The final distribution method used by manufacturers is where the
entity selling to the consumer is a retail dealer who is wholly without
corporate ties to the manufacturer and who generally handles the mer-
chandise line of more than one manufacturer. In a case now
pending82 the commission's complaint counsel are seeking to impose
liability upon a corporate manufacturer for deceptive sales practices
conducted by such a retailer.
The respondent in Grolier, Inc.8" publishes encyclopedias which are
sold door-to-door. One of the basic factual issues of the case concerns
the oral presentation made when these encyclopedias are sold. The
complaint alleges fourteen different misrepresentations or deceptive
practices including misrepresenting the purpose of the visit, misrepre-
senting that the offeree has been specifically selected for contact, mis-
representing that the products are sold without cost in return for the
offeree's endorsement and payment of a service fee and misrepresent-
ing that the publications have been endorsed by such groups as the
Better Business Bureau.84 Grolier denies that such representations
are made and further denies that if made, the representations consti-
tute a deceptive practice in commerce.85
Between Grolier and the consumer are various subsidiary corpora-
tions and independent distributors some of whom purchase products
from Grolier at wholesale and sell other lines of merchandise. The
commission's complaint counsel are seeking to hold Grolier responsible
for any deceptive practices that may be proven to have been committed
by these distributors and to impose upon Grolier the duty to police
otherwise independent retailers. The complaint counsel are not pos-
ig the issue as one of abrogating the standards for the imposition
of vicarious responsibility. Rather, by framing the question in terms
of the commission's power to order affirmative acts, they urge the com-
mission to draw upon a wealth of expansive statements by the Supreme
Court emphasizing the commission's broad discretion to fashion a rem-
acts of the subsidiary, an application of the new test of Collier might have reached
a different result. See, e.g., National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955);
Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., 30 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1929) (sub-
sidiaries were wholly owned with interlocking directorates).
81. Respondent's Trial Brief at 13, Grolier, Inc., No. 8879 (F.T.C., filed Mar. 9,
1972).
82. Grolier, Inc., No. 8879 (F.T.C. filed Mar. 9, 1972).
83. Id.
84. Id., Complaint at 10-12.
85. Id., Respondent's Trial Brief at 16.
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edy which will be disturbed only "where the remedy selected has no
reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist."8 6
Complaint counsel acknowledge that in Grolier "[tihe proposed
order . . seeks extensive and novel affirmative relief.187  They feel,
however, that the commission clearly possesses the power to impose
upon respondent the duty to insure that various persons not named
in the complaint who sell respondent's products abide by the terms
of the proposed order. The commission's power is asserted to be es-
sentially equitable and broad enough to require "affirmative acts to
cure the effects of illegal conduct and insure the public freedom from
its continuance.
'8 8
Characterizing the order as affirmative relief should not relieve
the commission from justifying the complete disregard for the prin-
ciples of vicarious responsibility. The relief requested appears too
novel to be justified solely on the ground it may bear a close relation
to the evil sought to be eradicated.
The courts which pioneered the move away from the common
law considerations acknowledged that acts of true independent and un-
related retailers would not be visited upon the product manufacturers.
With regard to the independent contractor relationship, the court in
International Art Co. v. FTC9 contrasted the nominally independent
contractors therein found to be agents of the respondent from true
independent retailers, such as department stores which handle many
lines of merchandise or auto dealers over whom the manufacturer pos-
sesses no legal control.90 In FTC v. National Lead Co. 1 the Supreme
86. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946), followed in FTC v. Na-
tional Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473
(1952).
87. Complaint Counsel Trial Brief at 63, Grolier, Inc., No. 8879 (F.T.C. filed
Mar. 9, 1972). The proposed order reads in part: "(c) Respondents advise each such
present and future salesman, agent, solicitor, independent contractor or any person en-
gaged in the promotion, sale or distribution of any of the publications, merchandise or
services included in this Order that respondents will not engage or will terminate the en-
gagement or services of any said person, unless each person agrees to and does file a no-
tice with the respondents that he will be bound by the provisions contained in this Order
." Id., Complaint at 42 (emphasis added).
88. Id., Complaint Counsel Trial Brief at 64.
89. 109 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1940).
90. "[The] argument and authorities are largely concerned with the relation be-
tween a manufacturer and a retail merchant. For example, [respondent] cites Mar-
shall Field and Company, a store which sells the products of the American Woolen
Company, and argues that the latter is not liable for representations made by the former
as to the products sold. We assume, however, that Marshall Field and Company acts
entirely in an independent capacity, and not as a representative of the Woolen Com-
pany. . . . These illustrations have no analogy to the present situation [where the
alleged independent contractors were really agents]." Id. at 396.
91. 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
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Court emphasized the commission's broad discretion and the reason-
able relation test while affirming the court of appeals' finding that the
parent corporation would not be liable for its subsidiary's conduct.92
Even the cases which best articulated the abrogation of common law
principles in imposing liability for the acts of independent contrac-
tors9" and related corporations94 presented fact situations which could
have resulted in vicarious liability under a common law test. 95
The order urged in Grolier, Inc. comes very close to the imposi-
tion of a rule of strict vicarious liability for deceptive sales practices.9"
92. 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955).
93. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957).
94. P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1970).
95. The Goodman facts are discussed in the text accompanying notes 40-41 su-
pra. The facts of Collier appear in the text at note 70 supra.
96. The duty to police an otherwise independent seller which would flow from
the commission or the courts upholding the order sought in Grolier evinces a strong
parallel to that duty incumbent upon finance companies and other purchasers of con-
sumer commercial paper to police their assignors' fraudulent sales practices under the
close connection doctrine. Under the doctrine when a close connection exists between
an original seller of consumer goods and the financier, that connection warrants the
establishment of a fictional agency relationship between the financier and the seller
such that the financier is denied any holder in due course status on the consumer con-
ditional sales contracts. The doctrine has developed because "the more the holder
knows about the underlying transaction . . . the more he controls or participates in
it, the less he fits the role of the good faith purchaser for value; and the less justifica-
tion there is for according him the protected status of the holder in due course .... "
Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739, 742 (Del. 1969). The holder in
due course status developed to further the free transferability of commercial paper but
this rationale is generally not applicable in a retail installment sale since neither the
seller nor the financier intends any further negotiation of the sales contract.
Since its initial promulgation in Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073,
137 S.W.2d 260 (1940), the doctrine has been accepted by a growing minority of state
jurisdictions and the District of Columbia. E.g., Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1973); United States Fin. Co. v. Jones, 285 Ala.
105, 229 So. 2d 495 (1969); Morgan v. Reason Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638,
73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Fi-
nancial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967); Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964); International Fin. Corp.
v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232
A.2d 405 (1967); Burchett v. Allied Concord Fin. Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d 186
(1964); Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950);
Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963). See
generally Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable
Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 667 (1968);
Note, Judicial Protection for the Consumer: Vasquez v. Superior Court, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 513, 529-37 (1972); Note, Implementation of Section 5108: An Appendix on Un-
conscionability in California, 25 HASTrNGS L.J. 53, 107-11 (1973).
At least one obvious difficulty exists with analogizing from the close connection
doctrine to the strict vicarious liability suggested here. The order contemplated in Gro-
lier would require no connection between manufacturer and seller except that of whole-
saler-retailer to give rise to the duty to police while the term "close connection" itself
[Vol. 25
In order to impose liability upon a manufacturer, the commission
would only need to show that a deceptive practice occurred in the sale
of that product. Legal separateness by corporation or proprietorship
would be meaningless in this context. While the strong public policy
of the act justifies a weakening of the tests used in ignoring legal
separateness, 97 no theory has yet been advanced, much less approved
by a court, which would support the complete disregard of the separate
entities.
Therefore, under the present law, the commission can find ample
authority to impose vicarious liability on manufacturers for deceptive
sales practices of independent contractors acting under apparent au-
thority or for the practices of related corporations. However, absent
new theories which could justify the imposition liability on this basis,
it is unlikely that the courts will approve the commission's creation
of a duty for manufacturers to police the selling practices of truly inde-
pendent, unrelated retailers over whom the manufacturers have no
legal latent power to control.
Strict Vicarious Liability for Deceptive Practices:
A New Approach to Consumer Protection?
At least two theories not yet examined by the courts or the com-
mission suggest themselves as possible justification for the commission
to adopt a rule of strict vicarious liability for deceptive practices. Ap-
plying the new test for disregarding the separateness of corporate sub-
sidiaries promulgated in the Collier case to the unrelated retailer situa-
tion poses no real hurdles given a commission of sufficiently liberal
inclination. By analogy, the commission would have to establish only
that respondent possessed the latent power to control the retailer and
knowledge of the deceptive practices. Latent power to control would
not have to mean legal power to control. Each manufacturer holds
the ultimate power of terminating its relationship with a retailer en-
gaged in deceptive practices. With the increased emphasis on the
strong public policy behind the act, the commission could find that
this power to refuse to permit a deceptive retailer to continue handling
the line of merchandise amounted to the latent power to control. If
only the means of obtaining knowledge of the deceptive practice were
required rather than actual knowledge,98 the test would effectively create
strict vicarious liability.
Alternatively, analogizing from the doctrine of strict products
liability presents another possible justification upon which the commis-
suggests more than a mere assignor-assignee relationship between the financier and
seller.
97. See text accompanying notes 37-41, 63-71 supra.
98. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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sion could impose strict vicarious liability for deceptive practices. The
policy behind this doctrine bears an apparent similarity to the policy
which led to the abrogation of the common law principles of vicarious
responsibility in the enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.99 The theory and policy of strict products liability in tort have
been stated in various ways, but the classic exposition remains Chief
Justice Traynor's opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.'
The purpose of imposing such strict liability was said in the Greenman
decision to be "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defec-
tive products are borne by the manufacturers. . . that put such products
on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless
to protect themselves."''1 1 The rationale behind strict products liability
was the same as the one behind the deceptive practices proscription in
the Federal Trade Commission Act-protection of the consumer. 10 2 The
development of both theories paralleled the retreat of caveat emptor.
Consumers "no longer approach products warily but accept them on
faith, relying on the reputation of the manufacturer." 103  They should
be entitled to expect an honest sales presentation as well as a product
free of defects. 04
Under strict products liability the risk of an injury resulting from
a defective product is placed upon the one who can best insure against
such a risk, the manufacturer. Placing the duty upon the manufac-
turer to insure that a product is fairly represented when sold seems
99. See text accompanying notes 37-41, 63-71 supra.
100. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In an earlier con-
curring opinion, Chief Justice Traynor had given the first judicial recognition to the
theory. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 443
(1944). His companion in advocating this position was the late Professor William L.
Prosser, who as reporter to the Second Restatement of Torts, successfully persuaded
the American Law Institute to adopt strict products liability in tort. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
101. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
102. Compare 16E voN KALINOWSKI, supra note 6, at § 38.05[4] with Prosser, The
Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122-24 (1960).
103. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
104. The justifications listed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, com-
ment c (1965) seem equally applicable to deceptive sales practices. "mhe seller, by
marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special
responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it;
that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs
and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand be-
hind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them,
and be treated as a cost of production . . .; and that the consumer of such products
is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper per-
sons to afford it are those who market the products." "Strict liability is a vehicle of
social policy." LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 376 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
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equally reasonable and in conformity with the policy behind the stat-
ute. As in the products liability situation, the manufacturer is in the
best position to control the methods employed in the sale of his prod-
ucts and to correct any abuses. Under this rationale, distinctions in
the imposition of liability based upon the legal formality employed in
distributing the product are difficult to justify. To be sure, in the
independent contractor or related corporation distribution situations
the manufacturer has a ready means of control. However, the ulti-
mate economic power of every producer or wholesaler to terminate
the retail agency should be sufficient to enable the manufacturer to
police that retailer. Policing the retailer will impose an additional cost
on the manufacturer but he can bear that cost as part of the respon-
sibility incurred when he places a product on the market. Using the
analogy of strict products liability in imposing vicarious liability for de-
ceptive sales practices could provide the commission with the legal ra-
tionale to justify a policy of strict vicarious liability to the courts.1
0 5
In attempting to apply the Collier doctrine or the strict products
liability in tort doctrine to a theory of strict vicarious liability for de-
ceptive practices, the commission will encounter several difficulties.
The analogy suggested to strict products liability pales when one con-
siders that strict products liability in tort was developed to redress phy-
sical injuries and not pecuniary losses. As the doctrine expanded fol-
lowing Greenman, damage to property was redressable' °6 and the class
of plaintiffs who could avail themselves of the remedy included non-
purchasing users 0 7 and third party bystanders.0 " However, Chief
Justice Traynor in Seely v. White Motor Co., 0 9 held that the rationale
behind the Greenman decision did not support the recovery of purely
economic or pecuniary losses on a strict liability theory." 0 The courts
feel much less outrage over a pecuniary loss than they do over a per-
sonal injury and while this position has been criticized,"' only a minor-
105. The federal courts have not been hostile to strict liability in tort. The
Eighth Circuit has recently held the doctrine applicable in a case arising solely out of
federal law. Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 635 (8th
Cir. 1972) (Death on the High Seas Act).
106. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965).
107. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
108. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1969).
109. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
110. "That rationale in no way justifies requiring the consuming public to pay
more for their products so that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility that
some of his products will not meet the business needs of some of his customers." Id.
at 19, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
111. Id. at 21, 403 P.2d at 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (Peters, J., concurring & dis-
senting).
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ity of jurisdictions have provided redress for pecuniary loss on a strict
liability theory." 2
Similarly, the extension of the Collier test to create strict vicarious
liability for deceptive practices is tenuous when the setting in which
the decision was rendered is closely examined. The interpretation is
totally inconsistent with the factual situation which confronted the Sixth
Circuit when it delivered the Collier opinion. "' Collier's operation
justified the imposition of vicarious liability under any test and in this
regard the new test could even be regarded as dictum.
Recent language in an a antitrust decision indicates that the Su-
preme Court continues to distinguish the amount of control a manufac-
turer has over related corporations or thinly disguised independent
contractors from the degree of control possessed over an unrelated re-
tailer. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,"' Schwinn was
per se in restraint of trade when it attempted to control the sales ter-
ritory and customers of its independent dealers who had purchased
their merchandise from Schwinn and upon whom the risk of loss
rested. 115 "If the manufacturer parts with dominion over his product
or transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control over
its destiny or the conditions of its resale."" 6 Schwinn could impose
such controls only upon franchised sales agencies who received their
bikes from Schwinn on a consignment basis."'
When a manufacturer exercises his power to control a retailer
by terminating him for deceptive sales practices, he subjects himself
to antitrust claims under the rationale of Schwinn."8 While the manu-
112. R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5A.17 (Supp. 1973).
113. The facts of Collier are discussed in the text at note 70 supra.
114. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Compare United States v. Timken Roller Bearing, 341
U.S. 593 (1951) (conspiracy in restraint of trade between related corporations where
the parent exercised control but not complete ownership); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (subsidiaries cannot combine with each
other in restraint of trade); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquor,
Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970) (separately op-
erated divisions of the same corporation can conspire); United States v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941) (wholly owned
subsidiary cannot combine in restraint of trade with its parent); cf. Schenley Distillers
Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432 (1946).
115. In Schwinn the Court reaffirmed its formulation of the indicia of an inde-
pendent businessman. The independent is one who sets his own price and upon whom
the risk of loss rests. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 20 (1964).
116. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967).
117. Cf. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (trade
association which wholesaled goods to its independent members could not control distri-
bution without being in restraint of trade).
118. But cf. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 565 (2d Cir. 1956).
"Merely because the corporate entities are disregarded for one specific purpose does
not require that they be disregarded for other or all purposes .... "
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facturer who so terminates pursuant to a FTC order of the type sought
in Grolir 119 can defend on that ground, this defense does not spare
the manufacturer the harassment or expense that comes with resisting
such a suit. A conscientious manufacturer who policed his retailers
prior to the entry of an FTC order would not have even this defense
available.
While the strong policy of the act coupled with these new theories
could persuade the commission or a court to adopt strict liability for
deceptive practices, the foregoing arguments militate against a court
established rule of strict vicarious liability for deceptive practices. If
manufacturers are to be charged with the duty of controlling the man-
ner in which their products are sold regardless of who does the sell-
ing, it is more likely that Congress will have to create this duty. Con-
gress indicated its willingness to protect the consumer by establishing
the commission and has continually taken steps to keep the act current
by amending it ten times during its sixty year history.1 20 The imposition
of such a duty would greatly increase the commission's efficiency and
eliminate a distinction that appears to have no sound basis given the
strong policy behind curbing deceptive sales practices. Nor would the
imposition of this duty force the commission's two divisions (anti-trust
and deceptive practices) into inconsistent positions. While the Su-
preme Court has noted that manufacturer's controls over an independ-
ent retailer may be destructive of competition, 12 ' the duty to control
the sales methods would not carry with it the power to destroy com-
petition by imposing price controls or other restraints.
Conclusion
The Federal Trade Commission, in its efforts to curb deceptive
business practices, continually faces the problem of establishing liabil-
ity as it issues cease and desist orders and procecutes violations of
those orders. While Congress may have recognized the ingenuity of
businessmen when leaving the commission latitude in determining
what constitutes a deceptive practice, 122 the courts have insisted on
some recognition of the legal forms under which those deceptive prac-
tices are perpetrated on the public.
The individual salespersons operating as independent contractors
and the owned subsidiaries distributing the product will almost invar-
iably be found to be agents of the manufacturer and he will be prop-
erly charged with their deceptive practices. However, there will still
be a class of independent retailers for whose acts the manufacturers
119. See note 87 supra.
120. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 [historical note] (1973).
121. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
122. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965).
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will have no responsibility. Notwithstanding the strong policy argu-
ments favoring the elimination of this distinction, the courts will not
likely make this radical departure from existing law, especially where
the change would establish a potential conflict with the antitrust
laws.123  Rather it will be left to Congress to seize the initiative and
impose further vicarious liability for deceptive practices.
A. Charles Dell'Ario*
123. See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972).
* Member, Third Year Class.
